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1 Introduction
This paper is written by a researcher from the “formal methods” community
who has been trying to understand notions used in work on “Dependability”.
The term dependability is used broadly to cover many aspects such as reliability,
integrity, correctness (with respect to a specification), availability, security and
privacy. To begin to understand such a range of concepts, this paper starts at the
bottom: the notions of fault, error, failure in [Lap92,Ran00]) appear to be both
useful and widely accepted. The idea here is to offer definitions of these terms
with respect to a particular notion of what constitutes a system. This choice is
discussed in Section 2 and an initial formalisation is outlined in Section 3. More
realistic notions of system are discussed in Section 5.
The intention here is not to offer formalism for its own sake. In fact, the
details of the particular notation etc. are unimportant. The hope is that under-
standing can be increased by building on a firm foundation. The first fruits of
the formalisation are given in Section 4 where, among other things, some rela-
tionships between systems are explored: the propagation of fault, error, failure
chains where one system is built on another system is well understood; many
of the failure propagation situations of interest in socio-technical systems arise
where one system is created by another. Lastly, the idea of one system being
deployed with another system is considered.
A concluding section lists some topics for further work including how the
system notion can be enriched.
2 Systems
There are many, rather different, things that can be loosely viewed as “systems”.
Few would decline to use the term for an airline seat reservation system. In such
a system it is easy to see an interface and the effect of using this interface. For
example, requests can be made and information displayed that reflects the con-
tents of a “database”; other interactions change the database of reservations so
that (as well as reserving a seat for a passenger) similar requests for information
at two points in time give different results. Other computer systems are linked
to processes that evolve autonomously. In, say, an automatic braking system
(ABS) for a car, the speed of rotation of a wheel is influenced by the friction of
the road surface which is not under control of the ABS.1 Less conventionally, the
“system” notion here includes those where humans play an essential role. The
adjective “socio-technical” is often used for such systems. The term computer-
based system is used here to indicate that, while a computer is involved, a study
of the system which ignores the human involvement is hopelessly inadequate.
1 Such systems are called “open” in [Kop02a] in contrast to a “closed” system where
all essential interactions are under control of the program. The target formalisation
must cover both closed and open systems. See [Kop02b] for more on Real-Time
Systems.
The emphasis in the Interdisciplinary Research Collaboration (IRC) on the De-
pendability of Computer-Based Systems2 is on such systems. Although taken for
granted here, it is not difficult to argue that a computer-based system can only
be made dependable by examining the roles of the people involved. This should
not be equated to an attempt to view humans as machines. It can, in fact, be ar-
gued that understanding potential human failure is a key step towards designing
systems that are safe and pleasant to operate or use.
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Fig. 1. A controlled system
To indicate the range of things that need to be covered, consider motor cars.
At a coarse level, one could distinguish the mechanical car from the human op-
erator or driver. In a modern car, however, the mechanics of the brakes etc. are
controlled by computer systems with which the operator actually interacts. A
typical linking of three systems (operator, control and (relevant portion of) re-
ality) is pictured in Figure 1.3 Each of these three classes of system has distinct
properties. An operator is likely to make unpredictable errors4 whose frequency
will vary over time; the likelihood of such errors will be influenced by how easy
it is to understand the interface of the control system. The control system re-
ceives signals from actuators operated by the human and from sensors that are
intended to measure aspects of reality. To earn the name “control system”, it
would have some degree of autonomy in sending signals to the actuators; it would
also provide feedback to the operator. The reality is a system itself which will
evolve even without inputs: for example, a car will continue to move while the
driver tries to decelerate. Each of the components indicated in Figure 1 can be
viewed as a system. The notion is also recursive in that the whole can be usefully
2 DIRC: Consult www.dirc.org.uk for information about the Dependability IRC.
3 The additional concept of an advisory system, together with an analysis of its failure
modes, is studied in [SO02] .
4 See [Rea90] for a classification of human errors.
viewed as one system for some purposes; it is also easy to see that each of the
systems might be further decomposed.
Because there can be several interlinked systems to consider, there is always
a danger of confusion over system boundaries. A lack of exactness here can give
rise to pointless debates about the cause of a problem with a system. The topic
of system boundaries is picked up in Section 4.2.
For many systems, it is useful to discuss a distinction between their exter-
nally observable behaviour (a “black box” view) and their internal design. For
example, a “transparent box” view of computer software involves looking at
its code. Many interesting properties of a system can be discussed via its “black
box” view that concerns only the behaviour at its interface. To make these issues
precise, it is time to turn to the topic of formalisation.
3 Formalisation
This section initiates the formalisation effort by considering simple systems; this
is not the limit of ambition of the paper but even such simple systems suffice
to illustrate some benefits of formalisation. The notion of system is enriched in
Sections 4.3 and 5. What follows is not claimed to be deep: it is a selection of
known concepts from formal development methods. The intention is to show that
these ideas make it possible to discuss core dependability notions more precisely
than in the absence of a formal foundation.
3.1 Simple systems
To view something as a system, it is necessary to choose an interface. An interface
offers a collection of ways of interacting with a system: here, interaction points
are termed “operations”. So, for example, a seat reservation system is likely to
offer some enquiry operations and others for reserving places. One requirement,
then, for pinning down an interface to a system is to list its operations. For a
simple (computer) system, each operation is likely to have a name. In addition
to the name of each operation, it is likely that there will be information that is
either required as input to narrow down the operation (parameters to an enquiry
might be starting and finishing locations) or information which is returned as a
result of the operation.5 The parameters and results of software operations are
normally recorded by some form of type annotation but, rather than worrying
about a specific notation for this, there is a more fundamental concept to be
understood.
If systems with even simple databases are to be described, it is necessary to
find a way of discussing how operations are affected by –and in turn affect– that
database. The notion of state can be used to generalise situations from those
where a system updates a simple counter to those where a large database is
5 One could discuss whether there is a single “reserve” operation or a whole set thereof;
for practical purposes it is worth grouping like operations together even though this
necessitates separating the idea of parameters and results.
required. Thus the formalisation of the behaviour of an operation will relate,
not only its parameters and results, but also state values. Is it true that all
systems, have a state? Strictly, no! A pure function like square root could well
deliver the same result (for a given parameter) at any time; even a sorting system
might behave like a mathematical function whose result does not depend in any
way on the history of its use. Be that as it may, it is useful to say that systems
do have states and to regard functions as a special case.
So a system will be characterised by its states and its set of operations. To
go further, formulae will be used — but remember what is made clear in the
introduction: these formulae indicate a possible notation; they are not the main
point of the paper.6
A description7 of a system comprises a class of states (Σ) and a set of named
operations. The states used in a specification will typically be an abstraction
of those of any particular implementation. The set of states can be defined, for
example, as VDM objects with the possible use of a data type invariant which
records that subset of the overall set of objects that can arise.
In simple cases, each operation OPi would be a function from states to states
OPi : Σ→ Σ. More generally, operations are not defined for all possible starting
states (or combinations of states and parameters). The fact that operations
can be partial is recorded in VDM or B by noting a pre-condition that defines,
what might be called, the “termination set” of an operation. (The notion of a
pre-condition is a simple example of an assumption about the deployment of a
system; this is key to the discussion in Section 4.4.)
The topic on non-determinism is important even for systems which will actu-
ally behave deterministically (i.e. always deliver the same final state and result
for a given starting state and parameters). It is often convenient in a specifica-
tion or description of a system to leave open the possibility of different results. In
order to record this, the effect of an operation is given by a relation over states.
Thus, the termination set for OPi is a set of states Ti : PΣ and the result
is a relation over states Mi : P(Σ × Σ). It is required for Opi = (Ti ,Mi) that
the meaning relation gives possible results for any state in the termination set
Ti ⊆ domMi .
To make this more concrete, consider the following description of a Stack
of natural numbers (N). A suitable model of the state is a sequence of those
numbers that have been Pushed onto the Stack but not Popped off: Σ = N∗. A
plausible list of operations might be Ops = {Init ,Push(i),Pop,Top, IsEmpty}.
The Pop operation (Pop = (TPop ,MPop)) only works (is defined) for non-empty
states and removes the top element of a stack (but returns no result)
TPop = {l ∈ N∗ | len l 6= 0}
6 The notation used here is motivated by VDM (cf. [Jon90]) but avoids specific details
and could trivially be translated into other notations such as Z (cf. [Hay93]) or
B (cf. [Abr96]).
7 The term specification indicates some official status; it is often more useful to discuss
“descriptions” of systems. There can be different descriptions for different purposes.
To emphasise that the meaning can be stated as a relation, it is written as
MPop = {([e]y l , l) | . . .}
Notice that TPop ⊆ domMPop but that the meaning relation would not be
defined for empty starting states.
In this case, the result is deterministic but the same style could be used to
specify an operation that yielded an arbitrary element of the stack
MArb = {(l , l(i)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ len l}
3.2 Concepts from development methods
There are a number of established development methods (e.g. VDM [Jon90] or
B [Abr96]) that are built around state-based specifications and which contain
useful, thought out, concepts that can be utilised when discussing systems.
The cornerstone of any formal development method is a precise notion of a
specification. The desirability of separating a specification from any implemen-
tation is one of the tenets of this paper. It could be extremely wasteful if users
were forced to understand the detail of an implementation in order to use an
artifact. Moreover, denying users a specification is likely to result in them de-
tecting properties that the developer regards as accidental; but any subsequent
change of these “irrelevant details” might offend the users. A classic example of
this was seen when early computer architectures were simulated on newer, faster,
machines: users frequently found that their legacy programs no longer worked
because they had relied on undocumented features of the instruction set. Cru-
cially, it is difficult to see how an engineering process can be used to create a
system where there is no initial notion of specifying the required properties of
the to-be-created artifact. The concept of what is required might evolve (see Sec-
tion 5) but at any time there ought be something other than the implementation
which defines the functionality.
There are different styles of specifications and there was at one time a claimed
dichotomy between model-oriented and property-oriented specifications but this
is now largely resolved by recognising that property-oriented specifications are
more conveniently used for basic data types whereas model-oriented specifica-
tions are better for systems with more complex states.
A model-oriented specification (as in VDM, Z or B) is built around a state
that is an abstraction of internal values retained by a system between uses. The
Stack example above retains the elements that have been Pushed onto (but
not yet Popped from) the stack; many operating systems store user preferences
(and maybe desktops) between invocations; or a database system might contain
enormous amounts of data about an enterprise. It is important to remember
that a good specification will be built around an abstract state and the VDM
literature (e.g. [Jon90, pp 216–219]) includes a discussion of specification “bias”
and offers a precise test for sufficiently abstract states.8 For now, it is only
8 An unbiased state is one whose equality can be tested by the operations of a system.
necessary to accept that the idea of using an abstract state in a specification does
not constrain implementations. What is specified is the behaviour as observed
via the operations of a system; the state is a convenience for the description.9
Methods like VDM offer a precise notion of what it means for a system to
satisfy a specification. In fact, this question can be addressed at the level of
specifications. To say that system B satisfies the specification of system A, is to
claim that for each operation of A, there is one in B that respects the specifi-
cation in A. An operation b respects a if it terminates for at least the required
termination set of a and is more deterministic than a (over the termination set of
a). Formally OPi sat OPs where OP = (T ,M ) iff Ts ⊆ Ti and Ts CMi ⊆ Ms .
There are important properties of this relation: it is, for example, reflexive and
transitive; furthermore, a reasonable set of programming constructs are mono-
tone in the relation. These mathematically expressed properties make for a useful
development method.10
There are two approaches to such proofs. The most commonly used data
reification proof obligation in VDM relies on finding a retrieve function (homo-
morphism) from the state of the implementation to that of the specification.
This rule suffices for most steps of development but is based on the assump-
tion that development always proceeds by adding detail. Lynn Marshall [Mar86]
identified an important case where this was not true and a complete rule that
uses a relation between the specification and representation states is described
in [Nip86,Nip87].
The topic of concurrency has proved challenging for formalisation. Whereas
the appropriate form of specification for sequential systems is uncontroversial,
pinning down a suitable specification notion for concurrent systems has led to
many experiments. The key challenge (see [Jon00,dR01]) has been to support
compositional development of concurrent systems. One approach is the use of rely
and guarantee-predicates to record assumptions and limits of interference for an
operation. Although [Jon83,Stø90,Col94] etc. apply the idea to shared-variable
concurrent systems, it is not difficult to argue that the notion of interference is
at the heart of what is meant by concurrency and that taming it is also essen-
tial in communication-based concurrency such as embodied in process algebras.
(Stirling describes a related approach in [Sti88].) While the details of such ap-
9 Because of the widespread literature on property-oriented specifications, it is worth
pausing to repeat comparisons that are elaborated elsewhere (e.g. [Jon89,Jon99]). In
the 1980s, model-oriented specification methods were much less written about than
so-called “Algebraic Specifications” of data types [AKKB99]. The objective of an
algebraic specification is to fix the meaning of the operations (or functions) solely in
terms of their interrelationships. For example, in an algebraic description of a Stack ,
a key equation is pop(push(i , s)) = s. It is actually interesting that such descriptions
can ever fix a system and it does work for small systems like a simple stack. In some
cases, the implied model (technically, equivalence classes of the word algebra of the
functions) is by no means minimal and even –for example– a definition of a Queue
is far less obvious than that of a Stack .
10 A discussion of “compositionality”, its importance, and why it is much harder to
achieve for concurrent programs can be found in [Jon00].
proaches to concurrency are not germane here, it is important for Section 4.4
to observe that concurrent operations can also be described formally including
assumptions on the environment in which the operations will be deployed.
For what follows, the single most important point from this section is that
there is a precise notion of satisfying a specification.
4 Some uses of the formalisation
This section begins to explore what can do done with the formalisation of even
simple systems.
4.1 Dependability notions
The division of what might loosely be called “problems” into faults, errors and
failures in [Lap92,Ran00] is a significant contribution to our ability to discuss
causes and effects. This section re-examines this basic terminology with reference
to the notions in Section 3.
The term failure in [Lap92,Ran00] is described as “A system failure occurs
when the delivered service deviates from fulfilling the system function, the latter
being what the system is aimed at.” (all emphasis in the original). Presumably
the intention of the phrase “what the system is aimed at” is to acknowledge that
a specification could itself be wrong or even not exist. The position taken here
is that an implementation can only be judged to fail if there is a specification
against which a deviation can be identified. Thus, a failure of an operation is
a behaviour that is not in accordance with the specification of that operation.
(Questions of missing or erroneous specifications are addressed in Section 4.3.)
An appropriate definition might therefore be
A system failure (with respect to a specification) occurs when the deliv-
ered service deviates from that specification.
Brian Randell in [Ran00] has made the additional point that failure is a
judgement that is made by another system. This observation sits nicely with
the view here. Clearly, one system can observe the behaviour of another and
emit messages that claim to report the detection of erroneous results. But such
Beckmesser-like systems are potentially just adding confusion unless their com-
plaints are based on a specification of the required behaviour. As the allusion to
Die Meistersinger indicates, the judging system could well be human. It could
also be wrong (in its judgements)! It is illuminating to consider how the no-
tion of one system judging another ties in with law courts. There is a pleasing
recursiveness in the way that a higher court can sit in judgement on the deci-
sions of a lower court and that judgement is in turn subject to the review of
a yet higher court. It is also known for non-legal institutions (history or –more
worryingly– the press) to express opinions on the wisdom of judgements from
even the highest courts. Courts do, of course, make their judgements against a
codified specification of behaviour: the law. They rely on evidence of deviations
from the law. It is thus possible to have a system in which error reports from
some sub-systems are “ignored” or overridden in a larger system.
To return to the domain of computer (based) systems, the main point being
made here is that the notion of a failure can only be judged against a specification
and such a judgement can only be made by another system. As indicated in Sec-
tion 3.2, a specification is anyway required in order for any plausible development
process to deliver a product that has a chance of satisfying its specification.11
The description of errors in [Ran00] is worded in terms of a state (“An error is
that part of the system state which is liable to lead to subsequent failure; an error
affecting the service is an indication that a failure occurs or has occurred.”) which
fits well with the state and system notions of Section 3. It is quite reasonable
to say that an underlying cause (fault) can give rise to erroneous values in a
state (the question of whether this is the abstract state is considered below).
The qualification “liable to lead to subsequent failure” can be taken to indicate
that erroneous values in a state might never be detected. This situation can arise
if particular sequences of operations are avoided (e.g. recording a wrong salary
in a database might not be detected if the employee leaves the organisation).
Erroneous values in a state can result in failure – but whether or not they do
depends on the operations used.
One might question whether the wording “that part of the system state”
precisely accords with the definition given here but this question can only be
judged by the original authors. The definition suggested here is
An error is present when the state of a system is inconsistent with that
required by the specification.
There are actually two sorts of inconsistencies to be considered. The implemen-
tation state is likely to be a reification of that in the specification (a set might
be represented by, say, a doubly-linked list). If the retrieved state is not that
required by a specification, then subsequent operations can expose a wrong re-
sult. When this happens an error has occurred and a subsequent failure may
follow. But it is also possible that the representation state is internally incon-
sistent (e.g. forward and backward list pointers do not agree): in this case an
implementation can malfunction in ways which are not easy to predict from the
specification. There is here a subtle question about the level of abstraction of
the notion of state in the definition of “error”. It is certainly desirable to be able
to describe behaviour in terms of abstractions of particular state representations
chosen in implementations. Unfortunately faults can manifest themselves at a
low level of abstraction. This is a serious obstacle and is one that is likely to
need some layering idea in the implementation to contain errors of this kind.
It is a corollary of the definition of fault given here that
11 Thus far, only logical failure of a single invocation of an operation has been con-
sidered; in order to discuss stochastic properties it is obviously necessary to define
requirements on (or measure) multiple observations.
Whether or not a failure occurs depends on operations invoked subse-
quently
The notion that something causes the erroneous state which has been taken
to be the internal manifestation of an error is useful. But the notion of fault is
described in [Ran00], “The adjudged or hypothesised cause of an error is a fault.”
Invoking judgement here could be argued to confound a cause and the process
of determining that cause. It might be preferable to be more definite about the
link with errors — here, the definition
The cause of an error is a fault
is suggested. It is of course true that attributing the cause is a judgement (which
can be erroneous). But as with failure, this is the task of a separate system. It is
interesting to observe that any judgement of what fault caused an error is likely
to need access to the internals (“transparent box” view) of a system.
In the definitions offered here, there is a clear separation between what might
be thought of as absolute truth and the judgements which are made about
failures and their causes. The notion of probability has also been avoided so far
by focusing on single failures; the separation of logical and stochastic properties
is maintained until some other issues are clear.
4.2 System boundaries
A source of significant confusion in trying to attribute faults/errors/failures is
the question of which system is being discussed at any point in time. Behind
the whole of this section so far is the assumption that the boundary of a system
is agreed. While this will not always be the case, it must be clear that little
consensus or understanding can follow from a discussion where the boundary of
a system is itself a matter of dispute. For example, a discussion of a rail disaster
between someone who observes the effect of a broken rail on a high speed train
and someone who is claiming that long term financing is the cause of all ills is
unlikely to be edifying. An agreement on the nesting of systems might help the
discussants understand each others’ viewpoint.
It is not always true that the boundary of a system is a clear and static con-
cept. Even before coming to socio-technical systems below, there are difficulties
to be considered. The topic of multiple interfaces is considered in Section 5. It
is also true that interfaces can change over time: on the micro-level, the topic of
rendez-vous is also considered in Section 5. But the question of interfaces which
actually evolve is a whole avenue of research which is recently receiving attention
(e.g. [JRW02]).
4.3 Systems that create systems
A significant contribution of the separation of faults/errors/failures is that the
terms can be used to explain causal chains with the failure of one system giving
rise to a fault in another. This is easy to see in the case where system B is built
on system A. An example is where software runs on some hardware in which an
(uncorrected) hardware memory problem gives rise to a failure of the hardware
to meet its specification; this is seen as a fault for the software (that is likely to
result in an erroneous value in the state of the running program). The purpose
of this section is to explore another relationship between systems.
The fact that a failure in one system can cause a fault in another is partic-
ularly interesting in the case where one system creates another. A simple case
of this is a manufacturing system that creates products: many sorts of failure in
manufacturing can result in faulty products. A specific example with computer
software is that a failure in a compiler can introduce faults into a program which
would have otherwise fulfilled its specification.
Thus a failure of the creating system A can give rise to a fault in the created
system B . The interest in DIRC extends to systems in which humans play a
role both by interacting with a final system and by their involvement in creating
such a system. In the former case, the concern might be with the way a system
embeds in a group of people; in the latter case, the consequences of the fact that
humans design or implement a system are considered.
One can view –as a system– the organisation that creates another system.
Thus the development organisation which designs and develops a program can
be thought of as a system that creates programs. These programs can, in turn,
be seen as systems which create computations.12
In an example like the Therac-25 [LT93], it is clear that failures in the de-
velopment organisation created a system that contained potentially fatal faults.
The deployed system included a faulty program and physical apparatus without
a secondary hardware guard. One can go further and analyse faults in the devel-
opment process and how they might have been caused by management failures
but that is not the objective here.
Good software development processes use some form of review or inspection.
This is a place where the program text (i.e. the “transparent box” view) is
necessary; this would also be true if one were trying to make the judgement –
without testing– whether a program was “fit for purpose”. This is a form of fault-
tolerance applied within the development process. As in most human processes,
inspections etc. apply some form of (human) diversity to increase the chance of
catching errors.
It is now easy to deal with the issue –alluded to in Section 4.1– of missing
or erroneous specifications. The position taken above is that the judgement that
a system fails can only be made against a specification. What if the “specifica-
12 It is worth saying a word in defence of the much maligned programmer: there is
an inherent difficulty in writing a program which will be mindlessly executed by a
computer. When constructing instructions for humans, there is the chance that a
stupid instruction will be questioned. One only need look at the chaos created by
the “work to rule” form of industrial action to see that humans rarely follow rules
as mindlessly as computers. Computers derive their power and their weakness from
the fact that they always work to rule!
tion is wrong”? Presumably, this means that the specification is in some sense
inappropriate; the specification might be precise, but it can be seen to result in
faults and failures in a bigger system. For example, a specification might state
that a developer can assume that the user will respond in one micro-second
— but failing to so do can result is fatal consequences. The developer writes a
program which “times out” after one micro-second and an accident occurs. It
is surely not right to say that the software system (which meets its specifica-
tion) is failing. Nor, of course, is it reasonable to blame “operator error” with
such an unreasonable assumption. The only reasonable conclusion is that it is
an earlier system which exhibited erroneous behaviour: the act of producing the
silly specification itself is the failure that causes a fault in the combined system
of software and operator. The judgement that a specification is “silly” must of
course be made by another (external) system. A similar argument can be made
for missing specifications: an engineering process requires a reference point.
There is one more relationship between systems that is interesting to consider:
the idea of deploying one system with another has already been hinted at and is
discussed in more detail in the next section.
4.4 Deploying systems
A system A can be deployed with another B13 and they may, or may not, live
happily ever after. Even with the simplest of systems discussed above, opera-
tions were specified with pre-conditions. For an artificially created system, the
assumptions (pre-conditions) are an invitation to the developer to ignore certain
possibilities. It is clear that robust systems should avoid unnecessary assump-
tions but almost no useful system can be created without some assumptions.
It is also this author’s experience that specifiers are much more likely to over-
look assumptions (pre or rely-conditions) than to fail to describe the intended
function.
It is a mistake to deploy two systems which do not respect each others as-
sumptions. Thus, a deployment of the Stack in a situation where more Pop than
Push operations can be used is a faulty deployment and is likely to result in a
failure of the combined system.
Section 3.2 refers to work on concurrency that enriches the notion of as-
sumptions and commitments by using rely and guarantee predicates. These can
be used to discuss the appropriate deployment of systems whose behaviour is
influenced by concurrent processes.
Nothing in the idea of recording assumptions makes, in itself, deployment
safer. It is like recording warnings on the box of an electrical product: if the
warnings are ignored, the customer might still be electrocuted. But the recording
of assumptions does, like the commitment part of a specification, at least make
it possible for the deployment process to be undertaken circumspectly.
13 It is tempting to think of this relationship between systems as embedding one system
in another; here a more symmetrical view like a cross-product is preferred.
The discussion in this section also links to hazard analysis in that there is
now a prompt to distinguish between hazards which can result from components
failing to satisfy their specifications and deployment errors where (assumptions
of) specifications do not match.
4.5 Error recovery
There is an extensive literature on “fault tolerance” and “error recovery”. Given
the definitions chosen in Section 4.1, it should be clear why the latter term is
preferred here. Space does not permit a full analysis of concepts like forward and
backward error recovery or exception handling here but some simple points are
worth making.
It is well understood that simple replication redundancy (as in “Triple Modu-
lar Redundancy”) can be used to guard against random faults or decay. Software
can deploy redundancy in a way which prevents single faults coming from data
corruptions resulting in failures with respect to the specification of the software
system. It should also be clear that some form of diversity is required to make
any impact on guarding against design failure.14 Given that the scope of DIRC
is computer-based systems, the ambition is to be able to describe tolerance of hu-
man failures. In this area, the distinctions in [Rea90] between “slips”, “rule-based
mistakes” and “knowledge-based mistakes” is interesting. It might be possible
to record assumptions about certain classes of operator error.
One more topic which is worth addressing is the view that there are often
“multiple causes” of a failure. This is commonly discussed in accident post-
mortems. The point made in Reason’s graphic “Swiss Cheese” picture in [Rea97]
is that any layer of fault-tolerance will have residual holes (thus the slice of
cheese) and that an accident occurs when circumstances are such that the holes
coincide. The position here is that each of the nested systems has failed. It might
also be true that (as in the Therac-25 case) the human system which created
the physical system deployed too few layers of protection or that the layers were
insufficiently diverse.
4.6 Further stimuli
It would be profitable to reconsider many of the points made in [Per99] in the
light of the formalisation above. To cite just one example, designing the archi-
tecture of a system so that user can both understand and predict its behaviour
is key to the dependability of computer-based systems.
A related source is the recent research of John Rushby on “pilot errors”.
Rushy [Rus99] uses finite state diagrams to describe systems. The notion of
system description in Section 3 of this paper is more general but would not
serve Rushby’s aim of automatic analysis. More controversially, Rushby requires
a finite state description of the pilot’s perception of the control system (in order
14 There is evidence (a joint paper with Ian Hayes and Michael Jackson is making slow
progress) that forms of rely-conditions can be used to describe fault tolerance.
to perform state exploration and locate inconsistencies). The difficulty of getting
users to couch their understanding of a system in this way is conceded in [Rus99].
It would be interesting to explore other approaches (such as rely-conditions) and
to question whether the user’s view is actually of the control system or of the
reality which is ultimately being controlled (see Figure 1).
5 Further work
This paper makes only a beginning and clearly much more needs to be done
with a cooperation between formalists and dependability researchers. Some of
these topics require further research but the direction of the work to be done is
relatively clear.
The notion of system in Section 3.1 is deliberately simple and there are many
ways in which enrichment is desirable. Principal among these is for systems that
interface with the physical world where states evolve autonomously.
Many systems deployed in safety-critical applications involve sensors which
link to physical phenomena like temperatures. This is of course the distinction
referred to above “closed versus open” systems (cf. [Kop02a]). One problem to
be faced here is that values are time-indexed quantities. This issue has been
faced by several researchers (e.g. Duration calculus, Mahony/Hayes[MH91]).
It is also imperative to recognise that systems themselves evolve. In the DSoS
project (Dependable Systems of Systems), building systems from components
which are not under the control of a central organisation is a major concern.
The interfaces of such components can change without consultation. Rather
than just say that such systems will never work, the approach being researched
in DSoS is to understand to what extent such interface evolution can be brought
under the control of an exception handling view (see [JRW02]).
Another issue which is being considered in the DSoS project is the fact that it
is frequently convenient to view a system as having multiple interfaces. Hermann
Kopetz talks of service, diagnostic and configuration interfaces. This idea might
usefully be generalised because something like evolving the topology of a system
is likely to have different behaviour than the basic operation interface. But it
does not appear that any new conceptual problems are introduced by splitting
the view of a system’s interface in this way.
The simple model of Section 3.1 assumes that any operation is executed
atomically (without interruption) and also that all operations are available at
any time. It is often argued that this is a reason for rejecting this model and
moving to a process algebra which can express the fact that the changes in which
operations are available can be expressed. In fact, it is not difficult to express
interfaces with such a rendez-vous behaviour. Several object-oriented languages
such as POOL [Ame89] offer, in addition to the methods of a class, a process
per class which executes in each object of that class to say which methods are
“available” at any time.
There is also the question of the meaning of the notation for describing
systems. If development methods are to be based on particular notations for
describing systems, there must be a firm semantic foundation in terms of which
the correctness of results like the monotonicity of refinement can be argued. For
VDM, (sets and) relations suffice (see [Jon87]) to prove, for example, that the
satisfaction relation is transitive and that it is monotone in standard program
combinators. For the sort of concurrent object-based language mentioned above,
the pi-calculus (see [MPW92,SW01]) has proved ideal (see [Wal91,Jon94,San99]).
For systems that create systems, some form of higher-order pi-calculus might be
required.
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